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In this intriguing paper, Jeffrey Williamson emphasizes that changes
in the age distribution of the population (especially the share of young
adults, the dependency ratio, and the like) are often much more impor-
tant than changes in population growth rates in explaining the magnitude
and direction of global factor ﬂows. He also stresses that the transition
period that follows a demographic change (such as lower fertility or
lower mortality) is usually very long: a century or even longer.
Consider ﬁrst migration. A sharp decline in mortality, especially
infant and child mortality (which may or may not induce parents to
reduce their fertility later on), changes not only the growth rate of the
population, but also its age composition. When the children in the
transitional cohort grow old enough to enter the labor market, the excess
supply of labor will depress wages and other working conditions. Later
on, when these children retire, wages will start to creep up. Young adults
are particularly prone to emigrate because they have the most to gain in
terms of lifetime income and other beneﬁts. This explains why young
adults from emerging nations in the middle of their demographic
transitions tend to ﬂee to the advanced nations that have completed their
demographic transitions.
Williamson offers two examples that ﬁt this parable: the European
mass emigrations (60 million people) to the New World prior to 1914 and
the contemporary African emigrations. In the ﬁrst case, demographic
changes sharply increased the share of young adults in the population in
the source countries in Europe. “The young adult boom produced a labor
supply glut at home which put pressure on land and other domestic
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(Williamson 2001). These trends eased off as the demographic transition
ran its course. According to Williamson, more than half of the European
mass emigrations prior to World War I were driven by demographic
factors.
However, I ﬁnd the second story (of the African emigrations) much
less convincing in practice. Suppose hypothetically that the demographic
characteristics of the African countries were similar to the demographic
characteristics of the richer OECD countries. Would that have caused the
intense pressure for emigration from Africa to Europe, North America,
and Australia to ease off completely? Would it ease enough so as to
render restrictions on immigration in high-wage OECD countries super-
ﬂuous? As Williamson points out, “the wage gaps favoring Europe over
Africa today are more than double the gaps that favored the New World
over poor Europe in the nineteenth century.” Furthermore, one has to
add to these gaps the various “goodies” such as health care and education
offered by the welfare states in Europe (I will come back to this point
later). I very much doubt whether these huge economic advantages for
living in Europe rather than in Africa are going to dissipate as the African
demographic shocks run their course. It seems that administrative
barriers to immigration from Africa to the richer OECD countries are here
to stay.
Williamson goes on to study ﬁnancial ﬂows and global capital
markets. But before following him in my discussion, I would like to draw
attention to a fundamental distinction between labor mobility and capital
mobility. As explained in Razin and Sadka (2001), factor mobility may
wear two guises. First is the mobility of the factor of production itself,
without the owner changing his or her national residence. Second, one
can look at the mobility of the owner with his or her factor of production.
The ﬁrst kind of mobility is typical for capital. The phenomenon of guest
workers can also be viewed as a factor mobility of the ﬁrst kind. Guest
workers are typically not eligible for all the amenities (especially in the
area of social insurance) of the host country. The second type of mobility
typically characterizes labor and is usually termed migration. It raises a
host of issues and considerations associated with the welfare state that are
not relevant for factor mobility of the ﬁrst kind: unemployment insur-
ance, pensions, health insurance and care, education, and so on. Also,
whereas we do after all care about the welfare of human beings (the
immigrants), we pay no attention to the “welfare” of capital.
Migration is intertwined with welfare issues. The incentives for
emigration are shaped by the various ingredients of the welfare state
beyond the economic return (that is, the marginal product) of labor as a
factor of production, which Williamson emphasizes. Pension contribu-
tions and beneﬁts, unemployment and disability beneﬁts, public educa-
tion for children, health care, and the like, are all part and parcel of the
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the return to labor in the form of wages in generating the pull-and-push
factors of emigration. The size of the aforementioned payments and
beneﬁts, the scope and the composition of the income redistribution
embodied in them, and the degree of eligibility of immigrants to beneﬁt
from them determine not only the incentives to emigrate, but also the
effect of immigration on the well-being of the native-born population and,
consequently, the attitude of this population towards migration.
What are the welfare implications of migration? Evidently, by their
revealed preferences, the emigrants are better off in their new homes.
Presumably, “those left-behind” in the source countries are worse off. Do
the receiving countries beneﬁt from immigration? It depends. Certainly
one area in which the receiving countries may gain is old-age security.
It is commonly agreed that the old-age security system is heavily
burdened in most countries and is in need of reform. For instance, Gruber
and Wise (1999) state that “the population in all industrialized countries
is aging rapidly, and individual life expectancies are increasing. Yet older
workers are leaving the labor force at younger and younger ages....
Together these trends have put enormous pressure on the ﬁnancial
solvency of social security systems around the world.”
Migration can help restore the ﬁnancial soundness of an old-age
security system. The Economist went as far as to say: “Demography and
economics together suggest that Europe might do better to open wider its
doors. Europeans now live longer and have fewer babies than they used
to. The burden of a growing host of elderly people is shifting on to a
dwindling number of young shoulders” (February 15, 1992).
However, when all the ingredients of the welfare state are taken into
account, the overall picture is quite gloomy. For instance, the U.S.
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences recently
sponsored a comprehensive study on the overall ﬁscal impact of the
“New Americans”; see Smith and Edmonston (1997). The study looked
carefully at all layers of government (federal, state, and local), all
programs (beneﬁts), and all types of taxes. It was estimated that the
overall net ﬁscal contribution of immigrants with at least high school
education who arrived in the United States between ages 20 and 35 was
approximately $150,000 over their own lifetime; but immigrants with less
than high school education, aged 20 to 40 years on arrival, impose an
overall net ﬁscal burden of $60,000 to $150,000 over their own lifetime.
In overlapping-generations settings, some of this ﬁscal burden may
be postponed into the indeﬁnite future under certain circumstances, so
that the receiving countries may beneﬁt from immigration; see Razin and
Sadka (2001). But even when the receiving country gains on average from
low-skill immigration, it is hardly conceivable that such immigration is a
Pareto-improving change; it is quite unlikely that low-skill, native-born
people will gain from low-skill immigration. Similarly, native-born
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from immigration of professionals. Presumably, most immigrants from
the African countries are relatively (to the native-born population)
unskilled. Hence, the receiving countries do not stand to gain from this
kind of immigration, and are likely to administratively restrict it.
Now, let me turn to the discussion of capital ﬂows. Williamson refers
to the hypothesis proposed by Coale and Hoover (1958): Rapid popula-
tion growth generated by a decline in child and infant mortality and/or
rising fertility boosts consumption (to satisfy the needs of the newborn
children) and shrinks saving; as these children grow to adulthood, their
savings rise, and then savings fall again close to and after retirement. A
similar inverse U-shaped curve is followed by investment demand, as the
entry of the grown-up children into the labor market “implies the need
for more investment in infrastructure to get the new entrants to work, to
equip them while at work, and to house them as they leave their parents
and form their own families.” Furthermore, Higgins and Williamson
(1997) conclude that early in life saving is dominated by domestic
investment, thereby generating a current account deﬁcit; see William-
son’s Figure 3. Later on, the decline in investment dominates the decline
in saving, thereby turning the current account deﬁcit into a surplus. Thus,
demographically young nations tend to be net capital importers and
demographically old nations capital exporters.
Williamson then offers three examples that ﬁt into this parable: the
ﬂow of capital prior to World War I from demographically old Europe
(especially Britain) to demographically young Argentina, Australia, and
the United States; the switch of Korea and many other East Asian
countries from net importing of capital to net exporting of capital along
their demographic transitions during the years 1950 to 1992; and the
switch from low to high, then back to low, growth rates of GDP per capita
in many of these countries during that period and beyond, as they move
along their transitions from high youth dependency ratios to high shares
of working-age adults, and then to high shares of elderly people.
The last example is of particular interest, as regression coefﬁcients are
estimated for the effects of the growth rates of the working-age popula-
tion and of the whole population on the growth rate of GDP per capita.
As expected, the ﬁrst coefﬁcient is positive and signiﬁcant, whereas the
second coefﬁcient is negative and signiﬁcant. Using these coefﬁcients and
United Nations demographic projections up to the year 2025, Williamson
concludes that demographic forces will signiﬁcantly retard economic
growth in East Asia. But is there not a reverse causality from per capita
growth of GDP to demographic changes through migration? For high
rates of growth of GDP per capita may attract young immigrants. In this
case, how accurate are the estimated coefﬁcients and the projections of
GDP per capita growth rates that are based on these coefﬁcients?
Finally, Williamson’s analysis of the behavior of savings and invest-
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the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle (1980). They demonstrated that long-term
averages of national savings are highly correlated with the same averages
of domestic investments in the OECD countries, despite the presumed
ﬁnancial openness of these countries. (Recall that free capital mobility
allows foreign funds to ﬁnance domestic investment, thereby eliminating
the closed-economy tight identity between savings and investment.)
There are some attempts in the literature to reconcile this puzzle by
resorting to some informational home-bias asymmetry (between foreign
and domestic investors) that makes domestic savings favor domestic
investments; see Razin and Sadka (2001) for more details. But I think that
Williamson offers an alternative explanation: As can be clearly seen from
his Figure 3, savings and domestic investment are positively correlated
because they both follow, more or less, the same inverse U-shaped curve
along the demographic transition path.
Of course, one should not interpret Williamson’s work as implying
that capital import and export can be fully or solely explained by a
country’s location along its demographic transition path. Other factors
count too, among them international rate of return differentials, “tax
havens,” income shifting within multinationals to take advantage of tax
rate differentials, and so on. But to conclude, after reading Williamson’s
paper, I am left with no doubt that “demographic shocks rival economic
shocks as determinants of factor ﬂows, especially in a world where policy
is pro-global.”
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